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    Hybrid / Tier-Anleihen - allgemein/Diskussion

    Aus dem Handelsblatt:

    Anleger erwarten Hybridbonds

    Yasmin Osman, Montag, 15. Februar 2010, um 10:23
    FRANKFURT. Eigentlich wollen die internationalen Aufsichtsbehörden Hybridanleihen von Banken möglichst bald abschaffen. Viele Investoren glauben laut einer Umfrage der Ratingagentur Fitch aber an eine Renaissance (RNS.NZ - Nachrichten) dieser komplexen Finanzinstrumente für Banken. "Fast zwei Drittel der Investoren rechnen damit, dass europäische Banken dieses Jahr weiterhin traditionelle Hybridanleihen platzieren werden", sagte Fitch-Analystin Monika Insoll. Etwa 55 Prozent der Investoren erwarten allerdings nur ein "moderates" Investitionsvolumen, neun Prozent eine "signifikante" Menge.

    In der Krise nicht bewährt

    Die so genannten Hybridanleihen sind nachrangige Bankschuldverschreibungen, bei denen die Zinsen und auch der Rückzahlungsbetrag gekürzt werden können, wenn die emittierende Bank Verluste schreibt. Daher werden sie bisher als Eigenkapital akzeptiert. Offiziell ist die Laufzeit dieser Anleihen unendlich. Tatsächlich steigt der Zinssatz aber spürbar, wenn die Bank das Papier nicht zum frühest möglichen Zeitpunkt freiwillig kündigt. 2009 brachten europäische Banken 60,2 Milliarden Euro dieser Anleihen an den Markt.

    Bislang durften solche Papiere bis zu 15 Prozent des Kernkapitals einer Bank ausmachen. Während der Krise hatte sich aber gezeigt, dass Banken selbst in Krisensituationen zögerten, Hybrid-Käufer an Verlusten zu beteiligen. Zudem stehen Banken unter enormen Investorendruck, ihre Bonds pünktlich zu kündigen und zurückzuzahlen, selbst wenn es das ökonomisch ungünstig ist. Die Deutsche Bank handelte sich Boykottdrohungen von Investoren ein, als sie Ende 2008 ein Nachrangpapier nicht kündigte.

    Deshalb arbeiten Aufsichtsbehörden an der Abschaffung dieser Anleihen. In Europa treten 2011 strengere Regeln in Kraft. Auf internationaler Ebene planen die Aufseher im Baseler Ausschuss noch schärfere Vorgaben für Ende 2012. Nach Meinung von Fitch-Analyst Gerry Rawcliffe, könnten Banken versuchen, dieses Zeitfenster zu nutzen, um nach den alten Regeln Hybridbonds zu begeben. Denn künftig dürfte diese Art der Bankanleihe riskanter und damit teurer werden.

    Zweifel am Anlegerinteresse

    "Es ist allerdings fraglich, ob die Regulatoren eine Flut solcher Emissionen im Vorfeld der neuen Regeln zulassen werden", sagt er. Das ist nicht alles: Es wird zwar für existierende Hybridanleihen einen gewissen Bestandsschutz geben. Doch zumindest die internationalen Aufseher haben angekündigt, dass dieser Bestandsschutz nur für Hybridanleihen gelten soll, die vor dem 18. Dezember 2009 begeben wurden. Bleiben die Aufseher dabei, hätten Banken nur sehr kurzfristig etwas von neu platzierten Hybridanleihen.

    Unklar ist auch, inwieweit Investoren an nachrangigen Bankanleihen interessiert sind: Seit die Europäische Kommission staatlich gerettete Banken zwang, auch ihre Hybrid-Anleger an Verlusten zu beteiligen sind sich Anleger der Risiken stärker bewusst geworden.

    Zuletzt hatte die West LB angekündigt, die Kupons für ihre Genussscheine und stillen Einlagen nicht zu zahlen. Zudem verringert sich der Nominalbetrag, also der Rückzahlbetrag, um fünf bis sechs Prozent. Zuvor hatte auch die Eurohypo (Xetra: EHY.DE - Nachrichten) angekündigt, den Nominalwert ihrer Genussscheine um einen niedrigen einstelligen Prozentbetrag zu kürzen.

    "Die Nachfrage der Investoren nach Bankhybridanleihen wird generell niedrig bleiben, da die finanziellen Risiken, die mit diesen Instrumenten verbunden sind, klarer geworden sind", schreibt die Ratingagentur Standard & Poor?s (S&P). Sie rechnet damit, dass 2010 ebenfalls einige Banken ihre Kuponzahlungen werden aussetzen müssen - vor allem, aber nicht nur, die Banken, die noch Staatshilfen beanspruchen.

    #2
    Aareal Bank Gruppe schließt Geschäftsjahr 2009 mit solidem Ergebnis ab

    Alle EK-Instrumente der Aareal Bank werden für 2009 voll bedient !!!

    - Vorsteuerergebnis im Gesamtjahr in Höhe von 86 Mio. EUR, nach 23 Mio. EUR im vierten Quartal
    - Risikovorsorge wie prognostiziert bei 150 Mio. EUR
    - Kernkapitalquote von 11,0 % nach Kreditrisiko-Standardansatz (KSA)
    - Erste Teilrückzahlung der SoFFin-Einlage bis Jahresanfang 2011 geplant
    - Vorstandsvorsitzender Dr. Wolf Schumacher: 'Wir haben uns in der Krise gut behauptet und sehen aus heutiger Sicht gute Chancen, unser Betriebsergebnis in 2010 zu steigern, auch wenn das Marktumfeld nach wie vor mit Unsicherheiten behaftet ist.'

    Die Aareal Bank Gruppe hat das Geschäftsjahr 2009 mit einem angesichts des schwierigen Marktumfelds soliden Ergebnis abgeschlossen. Das Betriebsergebnis des Konzerns lag nach vorläufigen, nicht testierten Zahlen bei 86 Mio. EUR, nach 110 Mio. EUR im Jahr zuvor. Auf das vierte Quartal 2009 entfiel dabei ein Betriebsergebnis in Höhe von 23 Mio. EUR, was im Vergleich zum Schlussquartal des Jahres 2008 einer Steigerung um 13 Mio. EUR entspricht.

    Die Vergleichszahlen für das Gesamtjahr 2008 und das vierte Quartal 2008 weichen ebenso wie die Zahlen der ersten drei Quartale des Jahres 2009 leicht von den bislang publizierten Werten ab. Grund dafür ist der erfolgreiche Abschluss eines mehrjährigen Projekts bei der Aareal Bank AG im Rahmen der IFRS-Rechnungslegung. Mit der Umstellung waren aus Ergebnissicht geringfügige Anpassungen in den Vorperioden verbunden.

    In Anbetracht des soliden Abschneidens im bisherigen Verlauf der Finanzmarkt- und Wirtschaftskrise und der guten Kapitalausstattung plant die Aareal Bank, bereits bis Jahresanfang 2011 mit der Rückführung der Stillen Einlage des Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung (SoFFin) zu beginnen. Über die Höhe der ersten Rückzahlungstranche wird zu gegebener Zeit entschieden. Für die Finanzierung der Rückzahlung stehen der Aareal Bank eine Reihe von Optionen zur Verfügung. Eine Entscheidung darüber wurde noch nicht getroffen. Allerdings eröffnet die hohe Kernkapitalquote von 11,0 % nach KSA, gemessen an der mittelfristig angestrebten Quote von 10 %, entsprechende Spielräume. Die Aareal Bank geht ferner davon aus, dass sie angesichts ihrer soliden Refinanzierungssituation im laufenden Jahr keinen Gebrauch von dem verbliebenen Garantierahmen des SoFFin für unbesicherte Emissionen in Höhe von 2 Mrd. EUR machen wird.
    komplette Mitteilung

    Kommentar


    #3
    AW: Hybrid / Tier-Anleihen - allgemein/Diskussion

    Sorry für Nachfrage...ist in der Vergangenheit schon diskutiert worden, allerdings im alten Board...

    Capital Funding GmbH WKN 707008: war das nicht dieses komische Teil auf Aareal mit Nennwert 25,- EUR? Hat jemand freundlicherweisen einen link zum Prospekt?

    Schon mal danke....

    Kommentar


    #4
    AW: Hybrid / Tier-Anleihen - allgemein/Diskussion

    Die 778998 ist das T1 Papier mit den 25€ Nennwert (7,125% Zinsen).
    Die 707008 ist das T1 Papier mit 100€ Nennwert (12M Euribor + 210bps)

    Prospekte der T1 & GS gibts auf der Aareal Webseite http://www.aareal-bank.com/geld-und-.../eigenkapital/

    Grüße K1

    Kommentar


    #5
    AW: Hybrid / Tier-Anleihen - allgemein/Diskussion

    Du meinst wohl den 778998

    Kommentar


    #6
    AW: Hybrid / Tier-Anleihen - allgemein/Diskussion

    Zitat von 1erhart Hier:25.02.2010, 07:07 Beitrag anzeigen
    Du meinst wohl den 778998
    Nö, k1 meinte völlig korrekt die 778998. Den die Wertpapierkennnummer ist weiblich.

    Kommentar


    #7
    Corealcredit gs

    So oder so ähnlich kanns gehen...


    COREALCREDIT BANK AG / Rechtssache

    19.03.2010 19:13

    Veröffentlichung einer Ad-hoc-Mitteilung nach § 15 WpHG, übermittelt durch die DGAP - ein Unternehmen der EquityStory AG. Für den Inhalt der Mitteilung ist der Emittent verantwortlich.

    -------------------------------------------------------------------- -------

    Zu Beginn des Geschäftsjahres 2008 hatten mehrere Genussrechtsinhaber den Rechtsweg gegen die COREALCREDIT BANK AG beschritten. Sie sind der Auffassung, dass die aus den Genussrechten folgenden Rückzahlungsansprüche nicht durch Verluste bis einschließlich dem Geschäftsjahr 2008 vermindert werden dürften.

    Die Klage betrifft die folgenden Genussrechte: WKN 810 303 WKN 810 304 WKN 810 305 WKN 810 309 WKN 516 975

    In einem Verkündungstermin am 19. März 2010 wurde die Klage durch das Landgericht Köln (Aktenzeichen des Landgerichts Köln: 87 O 159/08) abgewiesen. Die Urteilsbegründung liegt derzeit noch nicht vor. Ob seitens der Kläger gegen das Urteil des Landgerichts Köln ein Rechtsmittel eingelegt werden wird, ist der COREALCREDIT BANK AG aktuell nicht bekannt.

    Kommentar


    #8
    AW: Hybrid / Tier-Anleihen - allgemein/Diskussion

    Food for thought für den Sonntag Nachmittag meiner Sparkasse. Vielleicht kann
    mal ein "Zoologe" die wichtigsten Punkte bezüglich der geplanten Basel
    Regulation zusammenfassen.

    Performance review
    Since we published our best ideas on subordinated bank bonds on 06
    January, all recommended bonds have achieved a positive total return,
    which was on average 5.8% for the Tier 1's and 2.3% for the Lower Tier
    2's. Most banks have recently reported results for 2009 and we see no
    reason to remove an issuer from the list of preferred financials on the
    right due to credit concerns. We considered removing the EUR Tier 1's
    with first call dates in 2011 and 2012 following their strong performance,
    but with risk premiums versus German Bund at around 5.5%, we think
    they are still attractive if the issuers continue their current practice and
    redeem them on the first call date.
    Summary of our recommendations
    n Conservative investors with a low tolerance for credit risk should
    avoid subordinated bank bonds, in our view.
    n Investors willing to accept credit risk may build exposure to
    subordinated Lower Tier 2 bonds of selected banks (see page 5),
    while investors with an equity-like tolerance for risk should buy Tier
    1 securities of stronger banks and insurers that may call those bonds
    at the next call date.
    n We maintain a negative view on deeply subordinated hybrid bonds
    of weak banks and those that needed substantial government
    support.

    Preferred Financials
    Americas Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan
    Europe Allianz, Banco Santander, BNP Paribas, Credit
    Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, DnB
    Nor, Intesa SanPaolo, Nordea, Rabobank, SEB,
    Sociètè Gènèrale, Unicredit, Zurich Financial
    UK Barclays, HSBC Holdings
    Canada Bank of Nova Scotia, Royal Bank of Canada
    Australia Australia & New Zealand Banking Group,
    Commonwealth Bank of Australia, National
    Australia Bank

    A simplified overview
    Tier -1
    Perpetual bonds, coupons
    deferrable and non -cumulative
    (Preferred shares)
    Shareholders equity
    Common shares
    Upper Tier -2
    Usually perpetual bonds, coupons
    deferrable and cumulative
    Lower Tier -2
    Fixed maturity bonds, coupons to
    be paid, subordinated to senior
    debt
    Core Capital: no
    obligation to pay share
    dividends; Tier -1 coupons
    can be cancelled if Tier-1
    ratio would fall below the
    regulatory minimum
    (defined in the
    prospectus); lossabsorbing,
    i.e. nominal
    amount may be written
    down to remain solvent
    Loss-absorbing, i.e.
    coupon and principal can
    be written down to
    remain solvent; can also
    be fixed maturity bonds
    Only loss-absorbing in
    the event of insolvency;
    only subordinated to
    senior debt
    Senior bonds
    Fixed maturity bonds, coupons to
    be paid
    Outranked only by
    preferential or secured
    claims

    Corporate bonds
    Past performance is no indication of future performance. The market prices provided are closing prices on the respective
    principal stock exchange. This applies to all performance charts and tables in this publication.
    .
    Regulation takes the center stage in 2010
    The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel) and the Financial
    Services Authority (FSA) both published consultative documents on the
    future of banking regulation and capital requirements in December 2009.
    While both agree that bank capital needs to be fully loss absorbing and
    the definition of instruments that qualify as Tier-1 capital needs to
    become stricter, the consultation papers include a number of differences
    when it comes to eligible hybrid securities and the treatment of existing
    Tier-1 securities that would not qualify under the proposed new
    standards.
    Changes and their consequences
    1) The regulatory focus will be on core Tier 1, which consists of paid-in
    common equity and retained earnings. So far, a minimum core Tier 1
    ratio was only indirectly defined by the regulator, based on the minimum
    regulatory Tier 1 ratio and the maximum level of hybrid securities that
    was allowed to be included there.
    2) The FSA proposal intends to maintain a maximum level of 15% for
    innovative Tier 1 securities, i.e. those with a coupon step-up, within the
    Tier 1. Basel suggests continuing to define a minimum Tier 1 ratio
    (including hybrids) in addition to a minimum Core Tier 1. So long as the
    minimum core Tier 1 ratio would be met, an issuer may exceed the 15%
    limit in the regulatory Tier 1.
    3) Basel suggests a very strict definition for hybrid securities, stating that:
    n coupons are fully discretionary and non-cumulative,
    n bonds are perpetual and not callable for a minimum period of 5
    years,
    n the regulator needs to approve coupon payment and early
    redemption
    n principal can be written-down to absorb huge losses, or contingent
    conversion triggers are defined, and
    n no incentives for early redemption are included (i.e. no coupon
    step-up)
    Almost all existing Tier 1 securities would not qualify under this
    definition. Even some very restrictive German Tier 1 issues, which
    already include principal write-down language, would not necessarily
    qualify, as their write-up clauses require recovering the bond's principal
    before any allocation can be made to common equity. However, the
    Basel proposal requires a pari passu write-down and write-up, meaning
    that writing-up the bond principal would take longer. Based on current
    market surveys, such securities would be difficult to sell to fixed income
    investors, as their risk profile is too close to common shares.
    An alternative would be including conditional conversion triggers, similar
    to the ECN structure issued by Lloyds in late 2009. A trigger level for
    conversion could be based on the core Tier 1 ratio, requiring that the
    conversion rate, i.e. the number of shares, must be defined at issuance.
    As a consequence, the loss upon conversion would be large, as a
    substantial decline in a bank's Tier 1 ratio should most likely be
    accompanied by a large share price decline. To be able to issue such
    securities at reasonable costs, the trigger level for the core Tier 1 ratio
    "Need to know's" before buying / being
    invested in perpetual (hybrid) bank securities:
    1) Investors buying perpetual securities should have a long
    investment horizon. Hybrid bonds often turn illiquid and investors
    may need to wait until the issuing bank calls the bond, which is not
    necessarily the case at the first call date.
    2) Risk tolerance must be high to accept potential coupon nonpayments
    and principal losses, in a worst case. In terms of risk,
    investors should consider perpetual bank bonds comparable to the
    equity allocation of their portfolios. Alternatively, deeply
    subordinated bond could be seen as part of the high-yield bond
    allocation.
    3) Be aware of concentration risks: all stocks and hybrid bonds of a
    single issuer should be seen as one risky position, which should not
    exceed prudent limits.
    Fig 2: Intended simplification of bank capital
    Based on the Basel proposal
    Innovative Tier -1
    ECN, Contingent Capital
    Notes
    Upper Tier -2
    Lower Tier -2
    Tier 3 Will disappear
    Less important, but will
    continue to exist.
    Potential restrictions on
    allowed structures
    More restrictive
    structures to emerge
    Non-step Tier -1
    Common shares
    Will disappear
    Will disappear
    New, but most likely
    a niche product

    Corporate bonds - 2
    would need to be set rather low at 4-5%. Issuers are concerned that
    investors trying to hedge such securities by short-selling the stock could
    make a difficult situation even worse. Besides this, we are not sure if this
    type of security would attract traditional fixed income investors and
    believe that contingent convertible securities remain a niche product.
    Treatment of existing hybrid Tier 1 securities
    The FSA proposal includes a grandfathering for existing structures that
    would not qualify under the new rules for 10 years and a limited amount
    being accepted thereafter for a maximum of 30 years, meaning that
    banks would have little incentives to redeem existing securities early.
    Basel intends to provide only a short grandfathering period and would
    prefer to see banks replacing existing structures with new ones as soon
    as possible. As both proposals are in a consultative stage, this will be a
    crucial aspect to watch for investors speculating on an early redemption
    of a Tier 1 security.
    Tier 2 capital
    The Basel proposal intends to harmonize Tier 2, so there should be no
    subclasses going forward. Upper Tier 2 will most likely disappear and
    current Lower Tier 2 will lose importance. Currently, regulatory
    adjustments may be covered by an equal amount of Tier 2 and Tier 1
    capital, whereas the proposed guidelines include 100% Tier 1 coverage.
    The new definition maintains the gradual reduction of capital credit for
    Tier 2 securities once the security has less than 5 years to maturity left.
    With limited use and decreasing capital credit, we think most banks are
    likely to redeem existing Lower Tier 2 securities at their first call date. Tier
    3 capital, which currently covers market risks, will be eliminated.
    How to profit from this
    We think there will be a grandfathering period for existing structures, but
    regulators will most likely encourage banks to comply with the new
    definition as soon as possible by redeeming and replacing existing
    structures through call options or tender offers. We see most value in
    institutional Tier 1 securities having a fixed coupon for the first 5 to 10
    years and a floating coupon after the first call date. Among those, we
    favor low cash price bonds and we clearly stick to the strongest financial
    institutions for Tier 1 investments.
    Within Lower Tier 2 (LT2), we also prefer the step-up structures, but we
    are less conservative with respect to the selected issuers. We view the
    Bradford & Bingley case, where LT2 was not serviced, as an exception
    and believe that even banks using material government support will fully
    service their LT2 bonds.
    Fig 3: Bank capital securities - the future
    Likely new structure of bank securities
    New Tier -1
    Perpetual bonds, coupons fully
    optional and non -cumulative
    (Preferred shares)
    Shareholders equity
    Retained earnings and Shares
    Lower Tier -2
    Fixed maturity bonds, coupons to
    be paid, subordinated to senior
    debt
    Core Tier -1: no
    obligation to pay share
    dividends
    Only loss-absorbing in
    the event of insolvency;
    only subordinated to
    senior debt
    Senior bonds
    Fixed maturity bonds, coupons to
    be paid
    Outranked only by
    preferential or secured
    claims
    Senior to
    Senior to
    Senior to
    Fully loss-absorbing;
    coupons and principal
    may be lost without an
    issuer default; part of
    regulatory Tier -1

    Corporate bonds
    Corporate bonds - 3
    Recommendations
    We keep Credit Agricole on our list, which recently was underperforming
    the other selected Tier 1's, due to its Greece exposure via its subsidiary
    Emporiki. We think this may continue to limit the upside potential for
    Credit Agricole, but its hybrids already trade at sufficiently higher yields
    than peers, in our view.
    Barclays remains one of the highest yielding issuers in our selection, and
    recent results reaffirm our positive view – the bank exceeded earnings
    estimates with a GBP 9.4bn net income and an improved Tier 1 ratio of
    13%. We think Barclays’ subordinated bonds suffer much like its two
    troubled peers, which both need to switch off discretionary coupons in
    2010/11. However, Barclays did not need government support and we
    see low coupon risk for its Tier 1 securities.
    Insurance hybrids
    What Basel III is for banks, Solvency II is for insurance companies. Its
    requirements for Tier 1 securities to be considered as part of the
    regulatory capital are similar to the Basel criteria for banks. As a
    consequence most current insurance Tier 1 structures would not qualify
    as hybrid capital under Solvency II. We think there will be a
    grandfathering period for existing non-conforming structures of up to 5
    years after implementation of Solvency II (likely 2012), but beyond this
    date, insurance companies have a strong incentive to redeem their
    securities.
    We continue to prefer the bank T1 structures we recommended in our
    last edition to insurance T1, which is primarily due to higher offered
    yields (see Fig. 5). However we also see diversification value in adding
    some insurance Tier 1's to a portfolio of hybrid instruments. Our
    preferred issuers in the insurance sector are Allianz and Zurich, which
    have only a few outstanding liquid structures. Allianz reported solid
    numbers for 2009 and raised the share dividend, a supportive signal for
    hybrid securities. Prudential PLC has several subordinated structures
    outstanding, but its announcement to acquire AIG’s Asian business for
    about USD 35bn may impact its credit profile and we may only consider
    recommending its perpetual securities once we have a clearer view.
    Additions and removals
    We remove the bonds listed on the right from our lists, the Unicredit and
    BNP for valuation reasons and the SEB and SocGen due to low market
    liquidity.
    We highlight the higher risk in Lower Tier 2 securities of Lloyds and
    HBOS, reflected in their low credit ratings, but we think investors willing
    to accept High-Yield-like credit risk are well compensated and we believe
    those bonds are highly likely to be fully serviced. For the same reason, we
    also add LT2 bonds of other banks that received government support,
    including Commerzbank, Danske Bank and ING Bank. Investors may
    speculate on an early redemption, but should be prepared to hold those
    bonds until their final maturity.
    We add DnB Nor hybrid securities as the bank released convincing results
    and we already maintain it in our list of preferred financial issuers.

    Kommentar


    #9
    AW: Corealcredit gs

    Zitat von bumi Hier:21.03.2010, 21:53 Beitrag anzeigen
    So oder so ähnlich kanns gehen...
    COREALCREDIT BANK AG / Rechtssache

    Zu Beginn des Geschäftsjahres 2008 hatten mehrere Genussrechtsinhaber den Rechtsweg gegen die COREALCREDIT BANK AG beschritten. Sie sind der Auffassung, dass die aus den Genussrechten folgenden Rückzahlungsansprüche nicht durch Verluste bis einschließlich dem Geschäftsjahr 2008 vermindert werden dürften.

    Die Klage betrifft die folgenden Genussrechte: WKN 810 303 WKN 810 304 WKN 810 305 WKN 810 309 WKN 516 975
    Das sind übrigens die GS, die für 2008 dann heraufgeschrieben wurden. Worum ging es genau? Höhe des Verlustes, Treuepflichten oder mehrmalige Verlustteilnahme?

    Kommentar


    #10
    AW: Hybrid / Tier-Anleihen - allgemein/Diskussion

    Worum ging es genau? Höhe des Verlustes, Treuepflichten oder mehrmalige Verlustteilnahme?
    Kann ich nicht sagen, wird auch nirgends erwähnt. Geht mir eher ums Prinzip.

    Nach der AHBR-GS-Aktion und auch dem Coreal-Versuch bin ich etwas sensibel was auslegungsfähige bzw. auslegungsbedürftige GS Bedingungen angeht und meide im Zweifel solche Scheine. Der eigentliche Vorteil der knackigen 4 Seiten GS-Bedingungen kann da schon mal nach hinten los gehen wenn ein Komma falsch sitzt.

    Bei 200++ Seiten TIER Prospekten weisss man wenigstens vorher dass rechtlich, falls nötig, wenig zu machen sein wird.

    Kommentar


    #11
    AW: Hybrid / Tier-Anleihen - allgemein/Diskussion

    Zitat von gata Hier:23.03.2010, 10:50 Beitrag anzeigen
    Food for thought für den Sonntag Nachmittag meiner Sparkasse. Vielleicht kann
    mal ein "Zoologe" die wichtigsten Punkte bezüglich der geplanten Basel
    Regulation zusammenfassen.
    Danke für den Text! Vor den WestLB-Zahlen habe ich ein wenig Zeit.

    Dies ist die wichtigste Stelle:
    Almost all existing Tier 1 securities would not qualify under this
    definition. Even some very restrictive German Tier 1 issues, which
    already include principal write-down language, would not necessarily
    qualify, as their write-up clauses require recovering the bond's principal
    before any allocation can be made to common equity. However, the
    Basel proposal requires a pari passu write-down and write-up, meaning
    that writing-up the bond principal would take longer. Based on current
    market surveys, such securities would be difficult to sell to fixed income
    investors, as their risk profile is too close to common shares.
    Wenn es so kommt, wie The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel) and the Financial Services Authority (FSA) es sich vorstellen, werden es Landesbanken und Genossen es schwer haben, sich Hybridkapital zu besorgen (denn sie haben keine Aktien für z.B. CoCos). Über kurz oder lang sind Tierschlachtungen fast aller Alt-Emissionen zu erwarten. Es ist unklar, ob und wie sich ein vergleichbarer Markti für neue Tiere, hauptsächlich in Form von CoCos, entwickeln würde.

    The FSA proposal includes a grandfathering for existing structures that
    would not qualify under the new rules for 10 years and a limited amount
    being accepted thereafter for a maximum of 30 years, meaning that
    banks would have little incentives to redeem existing securities early.
    Basel intends to provide only a short grandfathering period and would
    prefer to see banks replacing existing structures with new ones as soon
    as possible. As both proposals are in a consultative stage, this will be a
    crucial aspect to watch for investors speculating on an early redemption
    of a Tier 1 security.
    Grandfathering-Regeln sind der Knackpunkt. Die Sparkassenstudie empfielt fix-to-float von erstklassigen Emittenten sowie LT2 auch von staatsgeretteten.

    Kommentar


    #12
    Frage zu BAWAG

    BAWAG CAP. FIN. (JERSEY) LTD. EO-FLR TR.PREF.SEC.00(10/.
    WKN 571346

    Weiß jemand wie sich die Zinsen o.a. Tieres nach dem 31.10. berechnen. Zur Zeit gibt es noch 8,7 % bei einem KW von 69,-?

    Danke.

    PS: Die dazugehörenden BAWAG prefs. entwickeln sich (7,125%) entwickeln sich im Moment recht gut. Das Tier noch nicht.

    Kommentar


    #13
    AW: Hybrid / Tier-Anleihen - allgemein/Diskussion

    @ Dante

    Danke für Info. Hier noch Teil II

    Table 1: Hybrid perpetual securities (new additions colored in blue)
    Sorted by currency and first call date
    First / Next
    Name Maturity Call date current FRN payment Ratings to call mat. Ask Piece ISIN
    EUR BNP PARIBAS CAP TRST III perpetual 23.10.2011 var 6.625 3mE+260 non-cum A/A+/Baa1 6.1 3.5 100.8 1+1 XS0135791217
    EUR CL CAPITAL TRUST 1 perpetual 26.04.2012 var 7.047 3mE+261 non-cum A-/A/A3 8.2 3.8 97.8 1+1 XS0146942189
    EUR DNB NOR BANK ASA perpetual 19.11.2012 var 7.068 3mE+325 non-cum BBB+/-/Baa3 6.2 4.3 102.0 1+1 XS0157873760
    EUR BNP PARIBAS CAP TRST VI perpetual 16.01.2013 var 5.868 3mE+248 non-cum A/A+/Baa1 6.3 3.6 99.0 1+1 XS0160850227
    EUR DEUTSCHE CAP TRUST IV perpetual 19.09.2013 var 5.330 3mE+199 non-cum BBB+/A/Aa3 /*- 10.2 3.8 86.0 1+1 XS0176823424
    EUR SG CAPITAL TRUST III perpetual 10.11.2013 var 5.419 3mE+195 non-cum BBB+/A-/Baa2 8.9 3.6 89.6 1+1 XS0179207583
    EUR ALLIANZ SE perpetual 15.01.2014 var 5.500 3mE+230 cumul. A/A-/A3 5.7 3.4 99.3 1+1 XS0187162325
    EUR HSBC CAPITAL FUNDING LP perpetual 24.03.2014 var 5.369 3mE+200 non-cum A-/A+/A3 8.0 3.6 91.1 1+1 XS0178404793
    EUR BARCLAYS BANK PLC perpetual 15.12.2014 var 4.875 3mE+105 non-cum A-/A/Baa3 11.3 3.4 77.1 10+10 XS0205937336
    EUR SOCIETE GENERALE perpetual 26.01.2015 var 4.196 3mE+153 non-cum BBB+/A-/Baa2 8.9 3.5 82.1 1+1 FR0010136382
    EUR CREDIT AGRICOLE SA perpetual 04.02.2015 var 3.719 10ySwap+2.5 non-cum A-/A/A3 14.0 5.7 64.0 1+1 FR0010161026
    EUR UNICREDITO ITAL CAP TRST perpetual 27.10.2015 var 4.028 3mE+176 non-cum BBB/BBB/Baa3 9.8 4.1 75.9 50+1 XS0231436238
    EUR CREDIT AGRICOLE SA perpetual 09.11.2015 var 4.130 3mE+165 non-cum A-/A/A3 7.6 3.5 84.6 50+50 FR0010248641
    EUR HSBC CAPITAL FUNDING LP perpetual 29.03.2016 var 5.130 3mE+190 non-cum A-/A+/A3 7.1 3.7 90.5 1+1 XS0188853526
    EUR BNP PARIBAS perpetual 12.04.2016 var 4.730 3mE+169 non-cum A/A+/Baa1 7.7 3.7 86.2 50+50 FR0010306738
    EUR SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA perpetual 21.12.2017 var 7.092 3mE+340 non-cum BBB-/A-/Ba2 8.3 5.8 93.1 50+1 XS0337453202
    EUR BARCLAYS BANK PLC perpetual 15.03.2020 var 4.750 3mE+71 non-cum A-/A/Baa3 10.0 4.7 67.9 10+10 XS0214398199
    GBP SOCIETE GENERALE perpetual 27.03.2012 var 5.750 3mL+110 cumul. BBB+/A-/A3 7.0 2.1 97.7 50+1 XS0292464244
    GBP NORDEA BANK FINLAND PLC perpetual 18.07.2014 var 6.250 3mL+235 UT2 /A/A1 6.8 3.8 98.0 1+1 XS0151270310
    GBP UNICREDITO ITAL CAP TRST perpetual 27.10.2015 var 5.396 3mL+176 non-cum BBB/BBB/Baa3 9.9 4.2 81.0 50+1 XS0231436667
    GBP CREDIT AGRICOLE SA perpetual 24.02.2016 var 5.136 3mL+157.5 non-cum A-/A/A3 8.7 3.8 84.0 50+50 FR0010291997
    GBP BNP PARIBAS perpetual 19.04.2016 var 5.945 3mL+113 non-cum A/A+/Baa1 8.5 3.4 88.0 50+50 FR0010306787
    GBP DNB NOR BANK ASA perpetual 29.03.2017 var 6.012 3mL+169.5 non-cum BBB+/-/Baa3 7.5 3.9 92.0 50+1 XS0285087358
    GBP BARCLAYS BANK PLC perpetual 15.12.2017 var 6.000 3mL+142 non-cum A-/A/Baa3 10.0 4.7 79.0 10+10 XS0222208539
    GBP BARCLAYS BANK PLC perpetual 15.12.2019 var 6.369 3mL+170 cumul. A-/A/Baa2 9.2 5.3 82.0 50+1 XS0305103482
    USD BARCLAYS BANK PLC perpetual 15.12.2011 var 7.375 3mL+233 cumul. A-/A/Baa2 9.2 3.1 97.0 1+1 XS0129959978
    USD GOLDMAN SACHS CAPITAL II perpetual 01.06.2012 var 5.793 3mL+76.75 cumul. BBB/A-/Baa2 15.9 5.4 81.6 1+1 US381427AA15
    USD HSBC CAPITAL FUNDING LP perpetual 27.06.2013 var 4.610 3mL+199.5 non-cum A-/A+/A3 7.7 3.0 91.1 1+1 USG463802037
    USD SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA perpetual 23.03.2015 var 5.471 3mL+154 non-cum BBB-/A/A3 11.0 3.6 79.1 100+1 USW25381DM89
    USD NORDEA BANK AB perpetual 20.04.2015 var 5.424 3mL+158 non-cum A-/A/A1 8.0 3.0 89.5 100+1 USW5816FCM42
    USD BNP PARIBAS perpetual 29.06.2015 var 5.186 3mL+168 non-cum A/A+/Baa1 7.8 3.1 89.0 1+1 USF1058YHV32
    USD DEUTSCHE BK CAP FNDG TST perpetual 19.01.2016 var 5.628 3mL+170 non-cum BBB+/A/Aa3 /*- 9.6 3.8 82.5 1+1 US25153RAA05
    USD CBA CAPITAL TRUST II perpetual 15.03.2016 var 6.024 3mL+174 non-cum. A+/A/A3 8.0 3.5 90.5 1+1 US12479BAA08
    USD BARCLAYS BANK PLC perpetual 15.12.2016 var 5.926 3mL+175 cumul. A-/A/Baa2 9.1 4.0 84.0 100+1 XS0269453139
    USD SOCIETE GENERALE perpetual 05.04.2017 var 5.922 3mL+175 non-cum BBB+/A-/Baa2 8.7 3.9 85.5 100+1 US83367TAA79
    USD CREDIT SUISSE GUERNSEY perpetual 15.05.2017 var 5.860 3mL+169 non-cum BBB+/A/A3 7.3 3.5 91.9 2+2 US225448AA76
    USD CREDIT AGRICOLE SA perpetual 31.05.2017 var 6.637 3mL+123.25 non-cum A-/A/A3 9.6 3.8 85.0 100+1 USF22797FJ25
    USD BARCLAYS BANK PLC perpetual 15.06.2032 var 6.860 6mL+173 non-cum A-/A/Baa2 8.1 7.2 87.0 1+1 XS0155141830
    Coupon Ind. yield & price (%)

    Table 2: Lower Tier 2 bonds (new additions colored in blue)
    Sorted by currency and final maturity date
    First / Next FRN disc.
    Name Maturity Call date current FRN margin* Ratings to call mat. Ask Piece ISIN
    EUR JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 12.10.2015 - frn 1.091 3mE+40 138 A//A1 - 2.0 94.8 50+50 XS0231555672
    EUR NORDEA BANK AB 08.03.2016 08.03.2011 frn 0.854 3mE+20/150 120 A+/A+/Aa3 1.9 1.0 99.0 50+1 XS0246023112
    EUR DANSKE BANK A/S 20.06.2016 20.06.2013 var 4.250 3mE+205 - BBB/A-/Baa2 5.4 4.2 96.5 10+10 XS0170248503
    EUR LLOYDS TSB BANK PLC 09.07.2016 09.07.2011 frn 0.992 3mE+30/80 1259 BBB//Baa3 13.2 3.6 85.0 1+1 XS0195810717
    EUR COMMERZBANK AG 13.09.2016 13.09.2011 var 4.125 3mE+90 - A-/A/A1 8.3 3.2 94.3 50+50 DE000CB07899
    EUR DEUTSCHE BANK AG 09.03.2017 09.03.2012 var 3.625 3mE+76 - A/A+/Aa2 /*- 3.4 2.0 100.4 1+1 DE0003933941
    EUR BARCLAYS BANK PLC 30.05.2017 30.05.2012 frn 0.859 3mE+20/70 311 A//Baa1 3.8 1.8 93.8 50+1 XS0301811070
    EUR SOCIETE GENERALE 07.06.2017 07.06.2012 frn 0.829 3mE+17.5/67.5 199 A/A/Aa3 2.6 1.4 96.0 50+50 XS0303483621
    EUR SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA 28.09.2017 28.09.2012 frn 0.957 3mE+25/175 310 A-/A/A2 3.8 1.9 93.0 50+1 XS0230339847
    EUR LLOYDS TSB BANK PLC 05.03.2018 05.03.2013 var 5.625 3mE+203 - BBB/A+/Baa3 6.1 4.1 98.8 50+1 XS0350487400
    EUR HBOS PLC 30.10.2019 30.10.2014 var 4.375 3mE+136 - BBB-/A+/Ba1 7.8 5.1 86.9 1+1 XS0203871651
    EUR HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 29.06.2020 29.06.2015 var 3.625 3mE+93 - A/AA-/A1 3.7 2.8 99.5 1+1 XS0222053315
    EUR ING BANK NV 16.09.2020 16.09.2015 var 3.500 3mE+136 - A/A/A1 4.5 3.4 95.2 50+1 XS0229593529
    GBP BNP PARIBAS 08.12.2015 08.12.2010 var 4.750 3mL+72 - AA-/AA-/Aa3 3.3 1.6 101.1 1+1 XS0221178584
    GBP LLOYDS TSB BANK PLC 29.04.2016 29.04.2011 frn 0.846 3mL+23/73 1437 //Baa3 15.0 3.5 85.4 1+1 XS0218023447
    GBP HBOS PLC 18.10.2017 18.10.2012 var 6.305 3mL+120 - BBB-/A+/Ba1 9.2 4.6 93.5 50+1 XS0325811296
    GBP AUST & NZ BANKING GROUP 07.12.2018 07.12.2013 var 4.750 3mL+143 - AA-/A+/Aa2 4.0 3.0 102.4 1+1 XS0171431660
    GBP HSBC BANK PLC 29.09.2020 29.09.2015 var 4.750 3mL+82 - A+/AA-/A2 5.2 3.6 97.8 50+1 XS0230339417
    USD HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 06.10.2016 06.10.2011 frn 0.454 3mL+20/70 147 A/AA-/A1 1.7 0.8 98.0 100+1 XS0269733258
    USD BARCLAYS BANK PLC 23.03.2017 23.03.2012 frn 0.424 3mL+17.5/67.5 385 A//Baa1 4.1 1.5 92.8 100+1 XS0292937165
    USD ING BANK NV 03.07.2017 03.07.2012 frn 0.451 3mL+20/70 400 A//A1 4.3 1.7 91.5 75+1 XS0306992545
    USD BARCLAYS BANK PLC 11.09.2017 11.09.2012 frn 0.455 3mL+20/70 319 A//Baa1 3.4 1.5 92.8 1+1 XS0229313696
    Coupon Ind. yield & price (%)
    .

    Reference Section on subordinated bonds
    This section is reprinted from our previous publications for your reference
    Fair valuation
    It is very difficult to derive fair values for deeply subordinated bonds due
    to the following challenges:
    n Contractual terms differ: conditions for cancelling or deferring
    coupons and using the principal to absorb losses are defined
    individually for each bond and may be enforced to a different extent
    by national regulators. In many cases, a bank has different types of
    bond structures outstanding.
    n Binary outcomes - all or nothing: In good times, perpetual bonds
    trade close to regular bonds, whereas their prices behave more like
    the company's stock in a crisis. The recovery value of perpetual
    bonds in case of an issuer default is most likely zero, whereas senior
    bonds usually recover some value in liquidation.
    n Perpetual bonds generally have lower secondary market liquidity
    than stocks, as they are traded over-the-counter and often turn
    illiquid once an issuer is in difficulties. Stop-loss orders, which are
    frequently used for stocks, would not work for such bonds. As a
    consequence, investors may be unable to sell positions if newsflow
    turns negative. However, it is difficult to estimate how much
    additional yield should be required to compensate for liquidity risk, a
    consideration that is also often overlooked in good times.
    Yield measures
    Perpetual bonds with call options have two common yield measures,
    yield-to-call and yield-to-maturity. Yield-to-call assumes the issuer would
    call the bond at the next call date, whereas yield-to-maturity
    approximates the perpetual nature of the instrument with a very long
    assumed remaining life.
    Both values may differ significantly, as the assumed remaining life of the
    bond is very different if the call date is close. This may lead to extremely
    high yield-to-call values if market participants think that the bond may
    not be redeemed at this date, pricing in a longer remaining life. On the
    other hand, if market participants firmly believe in the next call being
    executed by the issuer, the bond would trade close to par. This would
    lead to a low yield-to-maturity value if the current coupon is low and,
    vice versa, a high current coupon would result in an inflated
    yield-to-maturity.
    Ideally, investors should form an opinion on the expected remaining life
    and calculate the yield to this date (see yield example). However,
    estimates for early redemption are difficult, as many banks are no longer
    in a position to call perpetual bonds at the first call date. As a
    consequence, the two measures should be used to derive a best-case and
    a worst-case yield assumption. In the current market environment,
    yield-to-call usually shows the best-case yield that may be achieved and
    yield-to-maturity shows the lowest annual yield, assuming all coupon
    payments are made and the bond is repaid at 100% at a date far in the
    future. We caution against using these yield measures for bonds that may
    not pay coupons or principal.
    Yield example for callable perpetual bonds
    Different assumed redemption dates
    Bond 1 Bond 2
    Fixed coupon 7.50% 9.50%
    Bond price (%) 90 105
    Redemption (Call) Yield Yield
    in 1 year 19.450% 4.290%
    in 2 years 13.540% 6.740%
    in 3 years 11.640% 7.578%
    in 4 years 10.700% 7.990%
    in 5 years 10.150% 8.240%
    in 10 years 9.061% 8.730%
    in 20 years 8.560% 8.955%
    in 30 years 8.425% 9.012%

    Comparing perpetuals to high-yield bonds
    As many perpetual bank bonds are now rated below investment-grade,
    high-yield securities may allow a reasonable relative return comparison.
    There are, however, some differences to keep in mind:
    n Hybrids may lose coupon and principal payments without the issuer
    defaulting. However, this is now reflected in their lower ratings
    compared to a bank's senior unsecured rating.
    n The recovery value of defaulted high-yield bonds averaged at 45%
    over the last 27 years, whereas deeply subordinated bonds usually
    have zero recovery value in case of a bank default.
    Comparing perpetuals to stocks
    n Yield stock: dividend yield + expected price performance
    n Yield perpetual bond: discount rate that returns the current market
    value of the security assuming all coupon payments are made and
    the principal value is repaid at 100% at the next call date
    (yield-to-call) or an assumed maturity date far in the future.
    Downside scenario
    If a bank fails, both its stock and its hybrids are most likely worthless.
    Even if it survives but needs to be recapitalized, a bank's hybrid securities
    may suffer in similar proportion to the losses absorbed by common
    shares. Only if losses remain manageable, hybrids profit from their
    seniority to common shares. In this case, share dividends may be
    suspended, but coupons on hybrids can still be paid.
    Upside scenario
    In good times, hybrid bonds almost always underperform stocks, as their
    redemption value is limited to 100% and their coupon terms are fixed;
    whereas shareholders may earn higher dividends and price increases.
    Conclusion
    Deeply subordinated bonds are more attractive than stocks in a stock
    market that is trading in a narrow range or in a moderate cyclical
    downturn. In good times, stocks outperform hybrid bonds and in bad
    times there is little bond-like protection. There is even an advantage for
    stock investors in a period of market disruption, as stocks tend to remain
    liquid due to market makers on stock exchanges, whereas hybrid bonds
    are traded over-the-counter and may turn illiquid, preventing a stop-loss
    trade.

    Kommentar


    #14
    BoI

    Die BoI hat heute ein Umtauschangebot vorgelegt!

    Da es auch ein Angebot für die $-Tiere gibt sind wohl alle Hybriden betroffen.

    Hatte leider noch keine Zeit es zu analysieren.
    (Interessant aus meiner Sicht ist der Umgang mit dem 7.4% cum Hybriden XS0125611482. (Ich halte den seit 21.))

    Gibt es schon Stimmen/Meinungen dazu?

    Kommentar


    #15
    AW: Hybrid / Tier-Anleihen - allgemein/Diskussion

    Sieht so aus also ob heute und die letzten Tag Tiere auf breiter Front verlieren.

    Kommentar

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